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and child support, it follows that the 
make such terminated with the death 
of the former husband insofar as such payments are alimony 
Court (1937), H Cal.2d 733, 737 [72 P.2d 
I'arker , 193 Cal. 478, 481 [225 P . 
. Hamilton (1949), 94 Cal.App.2d 293, 
298 ; Bobet·ts v. , 122 Cal.App. 
\rith the 
) , although the obligation survives 
insofar as the payments are child 
(1949), 84 Cal.2d 552, 556 [212 
. Burwen , 216 Cal. 608, 612 [15 
reverse the judgment with directions consistent 
views. 
J ., concurred. 
Appellant's petition for a rehearing was denied December 
12, 1956. Shenk, J., Carter, J., and Schauer, J., were of the 
opinion that the petition should be granted. 
[L. A. No. 24036. In Bank. Nov. 20, 1956.] 
Estate of ISABELLA N. SKINKER, Deceased. NANCY 
SKINKER WEDDI.JE, as Executrix et al., Appellants, 
v. ROBER'r C. KIRKWOOD, as State Controller, Re-
spondent. 
[la, lb] Taxation-Inheritance Taxation-Deductions.-The com-
missions of an executrix and her attorney allowed as deduc-
tions for inheritance tax purposes should be the amount of 
statutory commissions in effect at the time of decedent's death, 
and not the increased fees as allowed by Prob. Code, § 901, 
as amended and effective at a later date. 
Deduction of commissions of executors, administrators or 
trustees in succession or estate tax, note, 92 A.L.R. 537. 
See also Cal.Jur., Taxation, § 423; Am.Jur., Inheritance, Estate and 
Gift Taxes, § 249 et seq. 
McK. Dig. References: [1, 2, 4-6] Taxation,§ 441(3); [3] Taxa-
tion, §441(4); Taxation, §436; [8, 9] Taxation, §437; [10] 
Statutes, § 161; [11] Decedents' Estates, §§ 219, 225; [12] De-
cedents' Estates, § 219. 
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!d.-Inheritance Taxation-Deductions.-Deductions allowable 
for inheritance tax purposes are not those 
the estate. 
[3] !d.-Inheritance Taxation-Deductions-Federal Estate Tax. 
-Under Rev. & Tax. Code, § 13989, the federal estate tax de-
duction is not the actual tax it either that 
amount or a smaller amount based on calcula-
tions. 
[ 4] !d.-Inheritance Taxation-Deductions.-Comrnissions allowed 
for inheritance tax may not be the commissions 
in the probate ; the intent of the 
enacting Rev. Code, § 13988, 
the commissions allowed executors or "com-
puted on the value of the decedent's estate as of the date of 
decedent's death," was not to allow as deductions the actual 
burden sustained by an estate, but a close approximation 
thereof, based on standards set up in the inheritance tax 
law. 
[5] !d.-Inheritance Taxation-Deductions.-Under Rev. & Tax. 
Code, § 13988, allowing as a deduction only "ordinary ex-
penses of administration," extraordinary expenses of admin-
istration, although borne by the estate, are not a deduction for 
inheritance tax purposes. 
[6] !d.-Inheritance Taxation-Deductions.-Application of "new 
rates," in effect after the date of decedent's death, to deduc-
tions for inheritance taxes allowable under Rev. & Tax. Code, 
§ 13988, would be unconstitutional as constituting a gift of 
public monies, and such construction should be avoided. 
[7] !d.-Inheritance Taxation-Deductions.-Inheritance taxes are 
fixed and determined in accordance with the law in effect at 
the date of death. 
[8] !d.-Inheritance Taxation-Vesting of Right to Tax-Sub-
sequent Legislation.-With respect to inheritance tax, the 
Legislature cannot by a subsequent act increase or decrease 
the rate, remit the tax, or in any way surrender, impair or 
limit rights that have become fixed. 
[9] !d.-Inheritance Taxation-Vesting of Right to Tax-Sub-
sequent Legislation.-vVhere an inheritance tax has become 
due, a subsequent act of the Legislature the tax 
reason of change in exemptions, tax rates or in any way 
a gift of state monies and is prohibited by Const., art. IV, 
§ 31, and retroactive application of such legislation is there-
fore prohibited. 
[10] Statutes-Construction-Sustaining Constitutionality.-When 
two alternative interpretations of a statute are presented, one 
of which would be unconstitutional and the other constitu-
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the court will choose the one that will the 
of the statute. 
Decedents' Estates- Executors- Compensation. --Whether 
extra fees or commissions should be allowed an executor in 
a given case, and if so how is committed to the discre-
tion of the whereas in the case of 
sions and fees determination is made 
the court's function limited to ministerial 
Id.-Executors-Compensation.-Statutory fees and commis-
sions allowed an executrix and her are in the nature 
of fixed and the interest thus from the stand-
point of heirs, devisees, personal and attorney, 
are substantive in character and not procedural. 
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San 
Diego County fixing an inheritance tax. h N. Turrentine, 
Judge. Affirmed. 
R. 1\L Switzler for Appellants. 
James "\V. Hickey, Chief Inheritance Tax Attorney, "\Valter 
H. Miller, Chief Assistant Inheritance Tax Attorney, and 
Vincent .J. McMahon, Assistant Inheritance Tax Attorney, 
for Respondent. 
McCOMB, J.-This is an appeal by Nancy Skinker Weddle, 
executrix of the last will and testament of Isabella N. Skinker, 
and R. JYI. Switzler, attorney for said executrix, from an order 
overruling objections to the report of the inheritance tax 
appraiser and fixing an inheritance tax due by reason of the 
death of Isabella N. Skinker. 
CHRONOLOGY 
i. Isabella N. Skinker died July 19, 1955. 
ii. Decedent's will was probated August 5, 1955, and Nancy 
Skinker \Veddle appointed as executrix. 
iii. At the time of decedent's death section 901 of the 
Probate Code read in part as follows: 
"The executor, when no compensation is provided by the 
will or he renounces all claim thereto, or the administrator, 
shall receive commissions upon the amount of estate ac-
counted for by him, as follows: For the first thousand dollars, 
at the rate of seven per cent; for the next nine thousand dol-
lars at the rate of four per cent; for the next ten thousand 





























v. The inheritance tax appraiser filed his inheritance tax 
report and allowed as deductions executor's and attorney's 
commissions based on the "old rates" which were in effect 
on the date of decedent's death. 
vi. Pursuant to section 14509 of the Hevenue and Taxation 
Code, objections were filed to the report by the executrix 
and her attorney, appellants. 
Appellants contended that the deduction allowable for 
inheritance tax purposes should be computed on the new 
and higher rates as set forth in section 901 of the Probate 
Code effective September 7, 1955. 
rrhe objections were overruled, and an order was made 
approving the inheritance tax report as filed and fixing the 
inheritance tax on the basis of the "old rates." 
The estate is not in condition for closing. 
QUESTION 
[la] In fixing the inheritance tax due by reason of the 
death of should there be permitted as a deduction 
the stahttory commissions allowed the executr·ix and her at-
as set forth in section 901 of the Probate Code in 
at the t1:rne of decedent's death on July 19, 1955, or 
the increased as allowed by section 901 of the sarne code 
amended and effective September 7, 1955? 
\Ve are of the opinion that the commissions of the executrix 
and her attorney, allowed as deductions for inheritance tax 
1Hereinafter tho rates in effect pursuant to section 901 of the 
Probate Code at the time of decedent's death on July 19, 1955, will 
be referred to as the "old rates." 
2 The rates in effect pursuant to section 901 of the Probate Code 




time of decedellt 's July 19, 
and not the increased fees as allowed by section 901 
of the Probate Code as amended and effective September 7, 
determined by the 
section 13988 of tbe Revenue and Taxation 
reads in follows: 
''The expenses of administration in the estate of 
any decedent are deductible from the appraised value of 
included in any transfer subject to this part made 
by the decedent. 
"Included in ' expenses of administration' are 
the 
" comrmsswns allowed executors and 
administrators under Section 901 of the Probate Code, com-
puted on the value of the decedent's estate as of the date 
of the decedent's death. 
'' The ordinary fees allowed attorneys for executors 
and administrators under Section 910 of the Probate Code, 
computed on the value of the decedent's estate as of the 
date of decedent's death. , 
If the statute specifically stated that ordinary expenses 
of administration included executor's and administrator's 
fees "under section 901 and 910 of the Probate Code in 
effect as of the date of death'' there would be no question but 
that the "old rates" should be used in computing the ordinary 
expenses of administration. 
The code section is not that explicit. It does, however, 
restrict its operation to the date of death in that it allows 
ordinary commissions '' ... computed on the value of decedent's 
estate as of the date of decedent's death." (Italics added.) 
In view of such language, the reasonable assumption is the 
Legislature intended that in said computations those rate 
schedules in effect as of the date of decedent's death were to 
be used. 
[2] Deductions allowable for inheritance tax purposes 
are not necessarily those paid by the estate. [3] Under 
section 13989 of the Revenue and Taxation Code, the federal 
estate tax deduction is not necessarily the actual tax paid. 
It is either that amount or a smaller amount based on the 
approximate calculations. (Of. Estate of Slack, 86 Cal.App. 
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2d 49 at 53 P.2d 125 CaL 
App.2d 408 at 411 [1 et 
This is also the situation with section 13988 of 
the Revenue and Taxation Code. The actual commission paid 
in the probate to section 901 of the 
Probate Code is based ''upon the amount of estate accounted 
for .... ' Section 13988 of the Revenue and Taxation Code 
allows as a deduction said commissions '' on the 
value of the decedent's estate as of the date of decedent's 
death.'' 
[4] Often the commissions allowed for inheritance tax 
purposes are not the amount of the commissions actually 
in the probate proceeding. The evident intent on the 
part of the Legislature was not to allow as deductions the 
actual burden sustained by an estate, but a close approximation 
thereof, based on standards set up in the inheritance tax law. 
[5] This is apparent from the provision in section 13988 
of the Revenue and Taxation Code, which allows as a deduction 
''ordinary expenses of administration.'' Extraordinary 
expenses of administration although borne by the estate are not 
a deduction for inheritance tax purposes. 
[lb] The reasonable interpretation of section 13988 of 
the Revenue and Taxation Code based upon the examination 
of the statutory provisions is that there should be allowed as 
deductions for inheritance tax purposes commissions based 
upon the schedule of rates provided by section 901 of the 
Probate Code at the time of decedent's death, that in the 
instant case, the so-called ''old rates.'' 
Such an interpretation is in keeping with the whole tenor 
of the inheritance tax law, which keys everything to the date 
of decedent's death. Section 13311 of the Revenue and Taxa-
tion Code defines "market value" as to any transfer as the 
market value as of the date of decedent's death. Section 
13402 assesses the tax upon that portion of the property 
''in excess of the exemptions allowable on the date of the 
transferor's death and at the rates which are then in effect." 
Section 13408 provides that where there are several transfers, 
the tax is computed as if all the property l1ad been transferred 
a single transfer at the date of death. Section 13951 makes 
the date of death the valuation date. Section 13983 allows 
as deductions debts of the decedent at the date of death. 
Section 13987 allows as deductions certain taxes which are 
lien at the time of death. l;ikewisc, section 14102 makes 
every tax due and payable at the elate of decedent's death. 
296 EsTATE OF SKINKER [47 C.2d 
These provisions indicate a clear 
tent to restrict the deductions for executor's and 's 
commissions to that effect at the date of 
decedent's death, that ease, pursuant to the 
''old rates.'' 
[6] The of the "new rates" to the deductions 
for inheritance taxes allowable under seetion 13988 of the 
Hevenue and Taxation Code vvould be as 
constituting a gift of public monies, and such construction 
should be avoided. [7] It is established that inheritance taxes 
are fixed and determined m accordance with the law in 
effect at the date of the which in this case would be 
the date of death. 
[8] The Legislature cannot by a subsequent act increase 
or decrease the rate, remit the tax, or in any way surrender, 
impair or limit rights that have become fixed. (Estate of 
Stanford, 126 Cal. 112, 118 et seq. [54 P. 259, 58 P. 462, 45 
T_;.R.A. 788]; Estate of Rossi, 169 Cal. 148, 149 [146 P. 430].) 
[9] ·where a tax has become due, a subsequent act of the 
T_;egislature reducing the tax by reason of the change in the 
exemptions, tax rates, or for that matter in any way, is held 
to be a gift of state monies and is prohibited by article IV, 
section 31, of the California Constitution.3 
Retroactive effect of such legislation is therefore prohibited. 
(See Estate of Stanford, supra, where it is stated at page 121: 
"We are, therefore, of the opinion that to give retroactive 
effect to the law of 1897 would conflict with the provisions 
of the constitution prohibiting the JJegislature from making 
any gift or donation of any pnb1ie money or thing of value. 
"\Ve quite agree with the appellant's counsel that 'an 
heir or legatee must take his estate on such conditions as at 
the time the state may have imposed'; and that subsequent 
legislation could not affect such vested right. And this rule, 
as already held, applies equally to the state, whose right to 
the fund in question accrued undrr the act of 1893. ") 
'rhe foregoing principles are applicable to the instant case. 
On ,July 19, 1955, the date of decedent's death, the tax 
"Article IV, section 31, of the California Constitution, ill imposing 
restrictions upon the Legislature, declares: " ... nor shnll it have 
power to make any gift or authorize the making of any gift, of any 
public money or thing of value to individual, municipal or other 
corporation whatever; provided, nothing in this section shall 
prevent the Legislature granting aid pursuant to Section :22 of this 
article." 
ESTATE OF SKINKER 
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in accordance with the inheritance 
law in effect that time. Such law included section 
1:3988 of the Hevenue and Taxation Code, and the rates for 
('xecutor commissions applicable at that time \Yere the "old 
rates." To read into section 13988 a change by virtue of 
section 901 the Probate Code, as it became effective ap-
two months thereafter, would be to read into the 
statute construction which would result in the tax due at 
the date of death being reduced. Such a construction would 
eonstitute a of state monies and should be avoided. 
[10] It is an established principle of statutory construc-
tion that when two alternative interpretations are presented, 
one of which would be unconstitutional and the other con-
stitutional, the court will choose that construction which will 
uphold the validity of the statute and will be constitutionaL 
(County of Los Angeles v. Legg, 5 Cal.2d 349, 353 [2] [55 
P.2d 206].) The proper interpretation of section 13988 re-
quires the applieation in the instant case of the "old rates." 
Estate of Spires, 126 Cal.App. 174 [14 P.2d 340], and 
Estate of Parker, 200 Cal. 132 [251 P. 907], relied on by 
appellants, are not applicable to the facts of the present case. 
Each of the cited cases dealt with fees for extraordinary 
services. [11] Extraordinary commissions and fees are dif-
ferent from statutory commissions. -whether any extra fees 
or commissions should be allowed in a given case, and if so 
and how much, is committed to the discretion of the court. 
In the case of statutory commissions and fees, the deter-
mination is made by the J_,egislature. The court's function 
is limited to a ministerial computation. 
[12] It follows that statutory fees and commissions, such 
as are involved in this case, are in the nature of fixed charges. 
'rhe interest thus created, both from the standpoint of the 
heirs, devisees, the personal representative and the attorney, 
are substantive in character and not procedural. ( Cf. Estate 
Potter, 188 Cal. 55, 60 [5] [204 P. 826].) 
'rhe soundness of the above principles was reeognized by 
this court in Estate of Parker, supra, ·where it is said at 
pages 141-142: "The amendment in question, to the extent 
that it removes aU limitation upon the amount which may 
be allowed to executors and administrators as extra com-
pensation for extraordinary services performed by them, has 
the effect of imposing new and additional liabilities upon 
estates in probate. A statute will not be given a retroactive 
298 EsTA'rE oF SKINKER 
construction which it will liabilities not 
at the time of its passage. 'Laws which create new obliga-
tions, or new or exact new because 
of past transactions, have been universally reprobated by 
civil and common law and it is to be presumed that 
no statute is intended to have such effect unless the ""T'+"''"" 
appears.' 
The order is affirmed. 
c. and 
concurred. 
CARTER, ,J.-I dissent. 
The majority opinion holds that the Legislature did not 
intend by the 1955 amendment to section 901 of the Probate 
Code (increasing the fees of administrators, which became 
effective after decedent's death, but was in effect to fix the 
executor's fees in the estate; see Estate of Johnston, ante, 
p. 265 [303 P.2d 1]) to make such amendment applicable 
in computing the inheritance tax on estates of persons who 
died before its effective date; that such an application of the 
amendment would be a gift of public money in violation of 
the Constitution (Cal. Const., art. IV, § 31) in that under the 
prior law only the old allowances for executor's fees could 
be deducted from the value of the estate in computing inherit-
ance taxes. 
There is no gift of public money contrary to the Constitu-
tion when we consider the applicable law. This court held in 
Estate of Johnston, ante, pp. 265, 270, 271 [303 P.2d 1], 
that the 1955 amendment to section 901 of the Probate Code 
applied to persons who had died before its effective date but 
where the administrator's fees had not yet been fixed. We 
there said: "We are of the opinion that the commissions 
of the executor and his attorney should be the amount of the 
statutory commissions in effect at the time of the settlement 
of the account and making of the order allowing compensa-
tion, to wit, in the instant case in accordance with the pro-
visions of section 901 of the Probate Code as amended and 
effective September 7, 1955 .... 'On the other hand [quoting 
from Estate of Spi1·es, 126 CaL.App. 174, 177 (14 P.2d 340)], 
the right of the executm· to a defined rate or standard of 
compensation is not vested as of the date of the decedent's 
death, nor even as of the date when he qualified as executor, 
but S1lch right first accrues at the time when by appropriate 
Nov. 1956] EsTATE OF SKINKER 
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order the amount compensation payable to him is deter-
mined and allowed. And since the right of an executor to 
compensation for extraordinary services is not established or 
vested until allowed by the court in the exercise of its discre-
tion, it follows as a direct consequence that the law in force 
at the time when the order is made constitutes the only law 
by which the power of the court is to be governed.' (Italics 
added.) 
"The weight of authority in the United States is to the 
effect that the law in force at the time of the settlement 
of the account, and not at the date of death, governs the 
amount of compensation allowed executors, administrators and 
their attorneys.'' In addition the same has been said: ''The 
matter of allowance of compensation to the personal repre-
sentative ... is generally made in and by the settlement 
of the final account. But the representative is not entitled 
to compensation until an allowance therefor has been made 
by the court, even where compensation is provided for by the 
will." (21 Cal.Jur.2d, Executors and Administrators,§ 892.) 
And further with reference to time of valuation for computing 
fees: ''Though the inventory value is prima facie evidence 
of the value of the property, it is not conclusive. That is, 
if the value as shown by the inventory is not satisfactory to 
all parties concerned, it should be left open to inquiry. In 
such event, a reappraisement and evidence of market value 
may be given effect. It follows that where property is dis-
tributed in kind, or where the representative is charged with 
the appraised value of property taken from the estate under 
mortgage foreclosure and applied to payment of the debt 
against the estate, the valuation in the inventory, in the 
absence of objection or circumstances tending to induce sus-
picion that the appraised value is not fair and reasonable, 
is the basis of estimating the representative's commissions." 
(21 Cal.Jur.2d, Executors and Administrators, § 888.) There-
fore, nnder section 901 the administrator's fees were properly 
computed on the basis of the law in effect at the time the 
order therefor was made rather than at the date of death. 
That was the law when the inheritance tax laws were adopted 
and still is. That law provided that the rates or amount of 
fees was determined as of such date rather than at the date of 
death. We must look therefore at the inheritance tax law. 
It provides that the "ordinary expenses of administration in 
the estate ... are deductible frorn the appraised value of 
property"; included in such expenses are "The ordinary 
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commissions allowed executors ... under of the 
Probate computed on th(~ value of the estate as 
of the date of . . death." (Emphasis & 
Tax. Code, § That is to say, the fees deduetible for 
the computation of the tax are those allowed section .901. 
Along with section 901 goes its construction when it is 
amended as to the applicability of the amendment to estates 
of persons dead as above pointed out. Jn other words 
the inheritance tax law im~orporates section 901 as 
a deductible item in eomput.ing the tax and that section when 
amended after a death still applies as seen from the foregoing 
authorities. The inheritance tax law (Rev. & 'fax. Code, 
snpra, § 13988) must be read as providing that administrator's 
fees may be deducted to the extent authorized by section 901 
as properly construed and applied ineluding the effect of 
amendments. So reading, the etreet of section 901 on the 
inheritanee tax law, it must follow that the law now is and 
always has been that the decl1retible fees are those applicable 
under section 901 at the time the fees are elaimed and allowed. 
Hence there can be no gift of public money because the law 
(inheritance tax law) has always authorized a deduction based 
on the rate effective when the order for fees is made. As is 
said in Estate of Slack, 86 Oal.App.2d 49, 54 [194 P.2d 61] : 
'' [lt is] the intent of the I_jegislature that the deductions 
[from the value of the estate in inheritance tax computations l 
to be allowed are only those which have been paid or in which 
the liability has been attached so that they are actually due.'' 
The majority opinion holds that because the fee deduction 
for inheritanee tax purposes ( § 901) must be on the value 
of the estate at the time of death, the rates must be those 
effective at that time. That does not follow because the fees 
are not computed on the valne of the estate at death. They 
are computed upon the amount of the estate accounted for. 
The key words are "on" and "value." It has nothing to do 
with the amount of the deduction allowed, that is, from the 
standpoint of rates to be applied. It has only to do with the 
base to which the rates-percentages are to be applied. It is 
to be computed "on" the value at death which means nothing 
more than a mathematical computation using the value at that 
time. It says nothing about the rates to be applied in deter-
mining the fees, that is, those existing after death when the 
estate is accounted for and the fees are based upon the 
amount so accounted for. 
It necessarily follows that the asrertainment of the arnount 
Bs•r ATE OF SKIN KER 
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of the taxes cannot be determined until the expenses of admin-
istration are known sometime during the estate proceedings 
<;Ven though the taxes are due on death under the inheritance 
tax law.* The determination of that amount depends on the 
deductions allowed and that in turn depends on the law in 
effect when the deductions are allowed. Allen v. Franchise 
l'ax Board, 39 Cal.2d 109 P.2d , is analogous. There 
it was held that an amendment to the income tax law which 
authorized the apportionment of a lump sum income over the 
years in which it was earned instead of allocating it all to one 
year, >vas applicable to ineome thus earned in prior years; that 
there '>Vas no gift of public money. It is there said (at p. 
114): "It cannot be <1enied that the result is to reach 
all of the income received by the affected taxpayers and, as in 
the case of other taxpayers, at the rates applicable in the 
years in which it was earned. No income is freed from tax 
liability. Taxpayers in the situation of the plaintiff are in 
effect merely given the same opportunity as all other tax-
payers to return their income for taxation in the year in 
which it was earned. 'l'he Legislature has said that the tax 
produced at the rate so applicable is all that the state is 
entitled to and that the taxpayers affected by the change 
should be treated as are taxpayers who return compensation 
in the year in whieh it was earned. . . . 
''There can be no constitutional objection to the result which 
affects only the tax base as distinguished from a tax rate 
change where, as in this case, the provision was enacted prior 
to the time the tax should become due and payable. The 
provision was enacted and became effective prior to the time 
when the state's right to receive or collect the tax accrued. 
'l'here is therefore no relinquishment of a vested state right." 
Similarly in the instant ease only the tax base, not the rate, 
is changed by the 1955 amendment of section 901. The amount 
of the tax is not known and it is not collectible until the 
expenses of administration are known including the authorized 
deductions such as administrator's fees. 
The inheritance tax law must be examined realistically. Its 
basic theory is '' ' ... that the inheritance tax is imposed 
upon the net clear value of what the transferee receives, and 
that to ascertain this the value of what he does not receive, 
in contemplation of law, must be deducted from the value 
*'fhey are not delinquent until two years after they become due 
and payable. (Rev. & Tax. Code, § 14103.) 
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of what the decedent left.' '' Knapp, 37 Ca1.2d 
827, 831 [236 P.2d 372] And: "While the tax imposed by 
the act is not a tax on property as such, but a tax upon one for 
the privilege of succeeding to property, the amount of the 
tax as to any beneficiary is to be determined according to the 
value of the 'net succession,'--that the value such 
property as remains him afler the satisfaction of s1wh 
charyes and burdens as may lawfully be satisfied in due 
course of aclrninistt·ation. It is only such property that can 
be properly said to actually pass to the beneficiary.'' (Em-
phasis added; Estate of IIite, 159 Cal. 392, 394 [113 P. 1072, 
Ann.Cas. 1912C 1014, 32 L.R.A.N.S. 1165] ; see also Estate of 
Miller, 184 Cal. 674 [195 P. 413, 16 A.I-l.R. 694] .) This funda-
mental basis will be thwarted if, as held by the majority, 
the estate must pay the increased executor's fees (Estate of 
Johnston, supra, ante, p. 265) but the beneficiary must 
pay taxes on that which he does not receive. Indeed, there 
is no recipient of the claimed gift of public money as the 
beneficiary does not get the extra compensation because it is 
paid to the executor who, under the law as properly inter-
preted, is entitled to it (Estate of Johnston, supr·a) ; it is not 
a gift to him. 
Such cases as Estate of ~Martin, 153 CaL 225 [94 P. 1053], 
Estate of Stanford, 126 Cal. 112 [54 P. 259, 58 P. 462, 45 
hR.A. 788], Trippet v. State, 149 Cal. 521 [86 P. 1084, 8 
L.R.A.N.S. 1210], and Estate of Potter, 188 Cal. 55 [204 
P. 826], are not controlling for they involved an attempt to 
relieve an estate from a tax after death. Here, as seen, the 
only question is the method of arriving at the tax or the basis 
for the computation of the tax. Since this court has held 
that the fees allowable to executors, administrators and their 
attorneys must be determined according to the law in effect 
at the date of the allowance of such fees, and the inheritance 
tax law makes sueh fees deductible items in computing the 
tax, it must follow that any such fees so allowed are deductible 
items in eomputing inheritance taxes. The application of 
this rule may have the effect of increasing the amount of the 
inheritance tax as well as reducing it. For example, an estate 
consisting largely of securities which enjoyed a high price 
listing at time of death, but suffered severe deflation in price 
due to eeonomic depression during the administration of the 
estate, so that the amount accounted for is far less than the 
value at the time of death, the fees allowable might be con-
siderably less even though the rate may have been increased 
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since the date of death. In such a case the value for inherit-
ance tax purposes would be the higher value at the date of 
death while the fees would be computed on the lesser amount 
aceounted for. In other words, the basis for computing the 
fees is not the same as the one used for computing the 
hence the applicable law need not be the same. 
I would therefore reverse the order. 
A. No. 24148. In Bank. Nov. 20, 1956.] 
Estate of EDW AHD J. J;'R~-\NKLIN, Deceased. ROBERT 
0. PFLl<JGEH, Appellant, v. BANK OF AMERICA 
NATIONAI-1 'l'RUS'r AND SAVINGS ASSOCL,\TION, 
Respondent. 
[1] Decedents' Estates-Executors-Compensation: Attorneys-
Compensation.-The rate of compensation allowed to executors, 
administrators and their attorneys should be determined by 
the law in effect at the date of the order allowing compensation, 
not that in effect at the date of death of decedent. 
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los 
Angeles County settling the final account and decree of dis-
tribution under a will. Alfred E. Paonessa, Judge. Reversed. 
Robert 0. Pfleger, in pro. per., for Appellant. 
No appearance for Respondent. 
THE COURT.-The question here involved is whether the 
compensation allowed to executors, administrators and their 
attorneys should be governed by (1) the law in effect at the 
time of the settlement of the account and making the order 
allowing compensation, or (2) the law effective at the date 
of death of decedent. 
[1] vVc are of the opinion that the proper rule is that 
the rate of compensation should be determined by the law in 
effect at the date of the order allowing compensation. (See 
Estate of Johnston, ante, p. 265 [303 P.2d 1] .) 
Since the probate court in the instant case did not apply 
this rule, the order appealed from is reversed. 
[1] Sec Cal.Jur.2d, Exncutors and Administrators, § 880, 899. 
McK. Dig. Reference: [1] Decedents' Estates, §§ 211, 849. 
